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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

WHEN MONEY MISTAKENLY PAID
TO THE DEBTOR IS
TRANSFERRED TO ITS RIGHTFUL
OWNER ON THE EVE OF
BANKRUPTCY—VOIDABLE
PREFERENCE OR CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST?

A basic policy that underlies the
Bankruptcy Code is equality of
treatment among creditors. Consis
tent with that policy, the Code gives
a trustee or debtor-in-possession the
power to avoid a preferential trans
fer made shortly before bankruptcy
that gives one creditor unfair advan
tage over others.'
Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code lists the elements that must be
proven for a transfer to be avoided
as a preference. The first element is
that there must have been a “ trans
fer of an interest of the debtor in
property.” ^ Accordingly, courts
have held that no preference takes
place when payment is made from
* Special Counsel to the law firm Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, New
York, N .Y .; member of the National Bank
ruptcy Conference.
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra Uni
versity School of Law, Hempstead, N .Y .;
Counsel to the law finn o f Fried, Frank,
Harris, Schriver & Jacobson, New York,
N .Y .; member of the National Bankruptcy
Conference.
' IIU .S .C . § 547.
2 IIU .S .C . § 547(b).

escrow funds^; when a note is paid
out of personal funds of comakers
without any payment by the debtor^ ;
when the debtor pays to the Internal
Revenue Service withholding taxes
held in a statutory trust fimd^; or
when funds are drawn on a letter of
credit.®
An interesting case that tested the
limits of the requirement that the
property transferred belongs to the
debtor is Mitsui Manufacturers
Bank v. Unicom Computer Corp. f
where the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a prepetition
transfer by the debtor to a creditor
of money belonging to the creditor
but mistakenly received by the debt
or did not constitute a preference
under Section 547 despite the debt
or’s temporary possession of the
money in the debtor’s bank account.
The Facts
Unicom Computer Corporation,
a computer equipment broker, ar
ranged a computer equipment lease
in 1983 between its client, Pitney
^ See In re Newcomb, 744 F.2d 621 (8th
Cir. 1984).
* See Brown v. First Nat’l Bank o f Little
Rock, A rk., 748 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1984).
’ See Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv.,
110 S. 0 .2 2 5 8 (1 9 9 0 ).
‘ See In re Clothes, Inc., 35 B.R. 487
(Bankr. D .N.D . 1983).
’ 13 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Bowes, Inc., as lessee, and Mitsui
Manufacturers Bank, as the lessor.
Unicom worked out the terms of the
agreement by which Mitsui pur
chased the equipment financed in
part from the Philadelphia Savings
Fund Society. The five-year lease
between Mitsui and Pitney Bowes
required Pitney to pay a monthly
rental of $44,197. The arrangement
was for Pitney to make monthly
payments directly to the Philadel
phia Savings Fxmd Society, which
then remitted to Mitsui the differ
ence between Pitney’s rent and the
amount of Mitsui’s monthly loan
obligation to Philadelphia Savings.
Soon after Pitney told Unicom
that it wanted to get out of the lease
midway through the five-year term,
Unicom located Cincinnati Milacron, a company willing to sublease
the equipment for two years at an
amount significantly less than Pitney’s monthly rent obligation. Pur
suant to an arranged deal, Pitney
sublet the equipment to Unicom for
twenty-four months at a monthly
rental of $20,000, and Unicom sub
let the equipment to Cinciimati Milacron for the same two-year period
at a monthly rental of $22,000. Uni
com then billed Cincinnati Milacron
each month for $22,000, of which
Unicom kept $2,000 as its broker’s
commission, and Unicom forward
ed $20,000 to the Philadephia Sav
ings Fund Society as partial pay
ment of Mitsui’s loan obligation.
Unicom then billed Pitney for
$24,197, which was the difference
between Pitney’s monthly rental ob
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ligation under the lease and Uni
corn’s monthly sublease payment.
However, Unicorn’s bill noted that
Pimey was to send this $24,197
payment directly to the Philadelphia
Savings Fund Society.
The loan from Philadelphia Sav
ings to Mitsui was scheduled to be
paid off two months before the expi
ration of the equipment lease to Pit
ney and, therefore, Pitney’s final
two lease payments were to be sent
directly to Mitsui. However, Uni
com failed to send Pitney a bill for
the final two payments until several
months after the five-year lease
term ended. When Unicom sent the
bill, it erroneously instructed Pitney
to send its payment to Unicom rath
er than to Mitsui. When Unicom
received Pitney’s check, it deposit
ed it in Unicorn’s general operating
account instead of merely forward
ing it to Mitsui. Unicorn’s mistake
was corrected several months later
when it sent to Mitsui the full
amoimt of “ Pitney’s misdirected
payment to Mitsui. ’’*
Unicom Files for Bankruptcy
Relief
Within ninety days after Unicom
corrected its mistake by forwarding
payment to Mitsui, Unicom filed a
Chapter 11 petition. Unicom then
filed an adversary proceeding
against Mitsui seeking to recover
Unicorn’s payment as a voidable
preference under Section 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Mitsui’s defense
was that the payment was not a
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preference because it was not a
transfer of Unicom’s property. That
is, Unicom was merely holding the
money in a constructive trust for its
rightfiil owner, Mitsui, and Unicom
never had any right to use it.
The bankruptcy court rejected
Mitsui’s argument and held that it
would be inequitable to impose a
constructive trust over the money
erroneously paid to Unicom and
subsequently paid to Mitsui. The
bankruptcy court reasoned that the
money was deposited in Unicom’s
general operating account and was
subject to Unicom’s control. The
bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed
in a 2-1 decision. Although the BAP
recognized that a constructive trust
in favor of Mitsui would ordinarily
arise under California law in these
circumstances, Mitsui faded to
prove that the equities mandated
such a result under federal bank
ruptcy law. The dissenting BAP
judge reasoned that once Mitsui had
established its right to the money,
the burden of proof shifted to the
debtor-in-possession to prove that it
would be inequitable to impose a
constructive trust over the funds.
The Court of Appeals reversed
the decisions of the bankruptcy
court and the BAP. Recognizing
that a transfer may be avoided under
Section 547 only “ if it involves
property of the debtor and the trans
fer reduces the amount of the bank
ruptcy estate avadable for the pay
ment of other creditors, ’’’ the court
focused on the question of whether
’ /d. at 324.

Unicom’s temporary possession of
Pitney’s final lease payment owed
to Mitsui rendered it Unicom’s
property. “ The key, of course, lies
with the correct definition of ‘prop
erty
the court noted. The Bank
ruptcy Code does not define ‘‘inter
est of the debtor in property’’ as
that phrase is used in Section 547.
However, Section 541 of the Code
governs “ property of the estate”
and was used by the Court of Ap
peals as a source of guidance for
determining the meaning of “ prop
erty” for Section 547 purposes. “ In
its simplest terms, property of the
debtor may be said to be that which
would have been property of the
bankruptcy estate had the transfer
not taken place, ” ‘‘ the appeals court
stated.
Focusing on Section 541, the
court noted that property of the es
tate does not include “ any power
that the debtor may exercise solely
for the benefit’’ of another. More
over, property of the estate does
not include “ property in which the
debtor holds . . . only legal title
and not an equitable interest. ’’ The
court thus concludes that “ some
thing held in trust by a debtor for
another is neither property of the
bankruptcy estate under Section
541(d), nor property of the debtor
for purposes of Section 547(b)
Id. at 324.
" Id. at 324. The court of appeals cited
Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S.
53 (1990), as authority for this statement.
■2 11 U .S .C .§ 541(b)(1).
” 11 U .S .C .§ 541(d).
“ 13 F.3d at 324.
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The fact that the particular type
of trust involved in this case was a
constructive trust, rather than an
express trust, was not relevant. The
court referred to an illustration in
the legislative history to establish
that point: “ For example, if the
debtor has incurred medical bills
that were covered by insurance, and
the insurance company had sent the
payment of the bills to the debtor
before the debtor had paid the bill
for which the payment was reim
bursement, the payment would ac
tually be held in a constructive trust
for the person to whom the bill was
owed.” '^
Once the court concluded that
property held by the debtor in con
structive trust for someone else is
not property of the estate and, if
transferred to its rightful owner be
fore bankruptcy, would not consti
tute a voidable preference, it moved
on to the question of whether the
facts of this case warrant imposition
of a constructive trust—an issue that
involves state law. The court noted
that under California law applicable
in the Unicom case, a constructive
trust may be imposed where the
debtor wrongfully detains property
of another as a result of simple negli
gence. The Court of Appeals distin
guished its prior decision in In re
North American Coin ¿c Currency,
Ltd. where the court applied Ari
zona law that requires actual fraudu-
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lent conduct on the part of the debtor
before imposing a constructive
trust.
In a footnote, the Court of Ap
peals characterized Unicorn’s con
duct: “ Although Mitsui has not ex
plicitly accused Unicom of any
deliberate misconduct, our reading
of the record indicates that some
thing more than excusable neglect
may be involved here.
The court
noted that Unicom cancelled its
original final billing to Pitney,
which correctly instructed Pitney to
make its payment to Mitsui, and
then substituted one instructing Pit
ney to send its payment to Unicom
instead. In addition, despite having
received prior notice from Mitsui’s
leasing portfolio manager that the
bill was in error, Unicom deposited
Pimey’s check in its own bank ac
count. The court also pointed out
that there was a five-week delay
before Unicom corrected the mis
take by sending its check to Mitsui.
Most significantly, the court said,
“ [i]t cannot be denied that the mon
ey represented by Pitney’s misdi
rected check belonged to Mitsui,
not Unicom.’’** The court also
found that, to the extent that Califor
nia law required Mitsui to trace the
wrongfully detained funds, it has
done so. *®Therefore, the court con
cluded that “ Unicom, having
wrongfully and by virtue of its own
mistake(s) acquired and retained
fonds properly belonging to Mitsui,

H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 368 (1977).
“ 767 F.2d 1573 (9th C ir.), amended,
774 F.2d 1390 (1985).
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had at most only a bare legal title to
those funds.” “
The court, however, did not end
the analysis with the application of
state law. ‘‘[W]hile state law must
be the starting point in determining
whether a constructive trust may
arise in a federal bankruptcy case,
that law must be applied in a manner
not inconsistent with federal bank
ruptcy law.” ^' But since Mitsui had
established that grounds exist under
state law for imposition of a con
structive trust, the burden shifted to
Unicomas debtor-in-possession ‘‘to
prove that it would be inequitable
as a matter of federal bankruptcy
law to impose a constructive trust
over those funds. ’
Unicom failed to meet this bur
den, the court pointed out, ‘‘Be
cause we find nothing that would
warrant overriding the dictates of
California law in favor of some un
specified, overarching principle(s)
of federal bankruptcy law, we hold
“ /¿ .a t 325.
2‘ /¿ .a t3 2 5 n .6 .
“ /¿ .a t 325.

that a constructive trust in favor of
Mitsui arose over the funds repre
sented by Pitney’s misdirected
check.” “ Therefore, Unicorn’s
preference action against Mitsui
must fail.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals was correct
when it resorted to state law to deter
mine the nature and extent, if any,
of the debtor’s interest in the funds
that derived from the check that was
mistakenly received and deposited
by Unicom.“ If California law
would have treated these commin
gled funds as if they belonged to
Mitsui, and as if they were tempo
rarily held by Unicom only as trust
ee under a constructive trust, then
transferring the funds to Mitsui pri
or to bankruptcy could not have
constituted a voidable preference.
“ /¿ .a t 325.
“ See, e.g., In re PCX, Inc., 853 F.2d
1149,1153 (4th Cir. 1988) (“ The existence
and nature of a debtor’s, and hence the
estate’s, interest in property must be deter
mined by resort to nonbankruptcy law . . .
or, as is the case here, state law. ’ ’).
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